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Can Inheritances Alleviate the Fiscal Burden 
of an Aging Population?
ERIK LUETH*
With pay as you go schemes in place, population aging will impose a heavy fiscal
burden on young and future cohorts. However, these cohorts may also profit from
larger inheritances as the number of heirs declines. The aim of this paper is to
explore the compensating potential of private intergenerational transfers. A
dynamic, computable general equilibrium model is employed allowing for a pay
as you go scheme, various bequest motives, and an endogenous labor supply. The
findings are twofold. First, the increase in future generations’ inheritances is
insufficient to make up for the demographic burden. Second, increasing the inher-
itance tax during the demographic transition may alleviate the fiscal burden of
future generations by improving overall efficiency. [JEL H55, E62, D58]
C
oping with the fiscal consequences of population aging is generally per-
ceived as one of the central challenges of the decades to come. With gen-
erous pay as you go schemes in place in most countries, policymakers, as well
as the general public, are particularly concerned about the demographic transi-
tion’s impact on intergenerational distribution. Most of the programs are of a
defined-benefit type. Consequently, an increasing ratio of retirees to workers
will impose a formidable fiscal burden on the young and yet unborn. This notion
is underpinned by empirical evidence. Recent generational accounting studies
find that 19 out of the 22 countries examined exhibit a fiscal imbalance to the




Vol. 50, No. 2
© 2003 International Monetary Fund
*Erik Lueth is an Economist in the Fiscal Affairs Department at the IMF. The author would like to
thank Michael J. Keen and Robert P. Flood for comments on an earlier draft.However, in addition to public intergenerational transfers in the form of social
security, health care, and old-age care programs, generations are linked by a
variety of private intergenerational transfers. They include, inter alia, bequests,
interest-free loans, or investment in the children’s human capital. Similar to their
public counterparts, these private intergenerational transfers will be affected by the
forthcoming demographic transition. Thus, it is possible that the overall resources
bequeathed by parents to all of their children stay constant, or that the inheritance
per capita received by each offspring remains unchanged; but it is not possible for
both of these magnitudes to remain constant during the demographic transition.
While the underlying transfer motive determines to which extent heirs profit from
a reduction in their number, it will be shown that all of the prominent transfer
motives imply an increase in the inheritance per capita. The aim of this paper is to
explore the compensatory potential of this increase in inheritances.1
While the joint welfare effect of public intergenerational transfers and popu-
lation aging has been extensively investigated (e.g.,Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987;
and Raffelhüschen and Risa, 1997), so far relatively little has been said about the
welfare implications of private intergenerational transfers. Where private transfers
have been taken into account, the authors usually confine their analysis to a single
transfer motive (Auerbach and others, 1989; and Raffelhüschen, 1989). Lacking
empirical evidence in favor of a predominant transfer motive, this approach seems
somewhat tenuous. This paper, therefore, investigates the welfare implications of
private transfers during a demographic transition by making allowances for dif-
ferent bequest motives.2
Of course, intergenerational transfers are not the only way in which the
demographic transition affects generations’welfare. In addition, population aging
will change factor incomes and entail substantial distortions of labor supply
decisions—effects that can be captured only in a general equilibrium setting with
optimizing agents. In order to give a comprehensive assessment of the transition’s
impact on intergenerational distribution, this study resorts to a computable,
dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in the tradition
of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). The framework permits changes to be
made in the representative agent’s transfer motive and labor supply decision sim-
ply by modifying some parameters in his utility function. Accordingly, the effects
of specific transfer motives or distortionary taxes can be isolated by way of com-
parative static analysis. The main findings are twofold. First, the increase in
future generations’inheritances is not sufficient to compensate for the fiscal bur-
den. Second, increasing taxes on bequests during the demographic transition may
improve overall efficiency and, in this way, alleviate the demographic burden of
future generations.
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1It should be noted that population aging caused by longevity instead of fertility shock has, if any-
thing, a negative impact on inheritances per capita. However, population aging is primarily driven by the
baby-boom, baby-bust pattern of the past rather than by longevity. For example, an increase in life
expectancy by ten years relative to the baseline case of the German Statistical Office (Sommer, 1994)
increases the old-age dependency ratio by a mere 3.6 percent in 2030. Given that the dependency ratio
doubles between now and 2030, this seems negligible.
2For an overview of the empirical literature on private intergenerational transfers refer to Lueth (2001).I. The Model
Consider an economy that is made up of individuals with identical preferences and
a maximum life expectancy of two periods. While everybody lives through the
first period of life, the probability of surviving to the end of the second period is
π . After the first period of life, each individual has (1+nt) children, where t is the
parent’s generation index. Consequently, at any given point in time, the economy
comprises two overlapping generations.
It is assumed that the preferences of a representative agent born in t can be
described by the following expected utility function with constant elasticities of
substitution:
(1)
According to this formulation, the individual derives utility from first- and second-
period consumption, c1
t and c2
t+1; leisure, lt; the per capita inheritance left to his
children, I
j
t+1; and overall attention provided by his children, At+1. Consumption
and inheritances are measured in units of a single commodity, leisure as a fraction
of the individual’s overall disposable time, and attention as his children’s overall
disposable time not dedicated to work. Agents value future less than present con-
sumption for two reasons. First, not knowing whether they will still be alive, they
weight future consumption with the probability of survival, π . Second, they dis-
count future consumption at the rate of time preference, δ , illustrating the general
uncertainty associated with events in the future. The parameters ν , µ, and ϕ deter-
mine the intensity of the desire for leisure, bequeathing, and attention, respec-
tively. While λ stands for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ρ denotes the
elasticity of substitution between first-period consumption and leisure whenever
the labor supply is endogenous. Lacking empirical evidence of the substitutability
among consumption, bequests, and attention, there is little reason to resort to a
more general and, thus, more complicated functional form.
The agent works in the first period of life. With overall disposable time set to
unity, a fraction, lt, dedicated to leisure, and a fraction, at, of the remainder dedi-
cated to his parents, the agent’s labor supply equals (1–lt)(1– at). He earns a wage,
wt, per unit of time, which is taxed at rate τ t. In addition to his earnings, the rep-
resentative agent receives an inheritance, Ia
t,w here the superscript a stands for
“accidental.” This inheritance is left behind by short-lived parents, who, in the
absence of corresponding markets, were unable to annuitize the wealth provided
for the possibility of longevity. With savings denoted st, the agent’s first-period
budget constraint can be stated as
(2) cI a l w s tt
a
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180If the agent survives to the end of the second period, he gains interest on his sav-
ings at rate rt+1. Furthermore, he receives an inheritance, I
j
t, that his parents left
behind for joy of giving, as well as an inheritance, Ix
t, in exchange for filial atten-
tion. Since both inheritances constitute wealth accumulated in the previous period,
they too yield interest at the market interest rate. These earnings, together with an
old-age benefit, trt+1,a re spent on second-period consumption and bequests. The
latter, whether motivated by joy of giving or in exchange for attention, are taxed
at a uniform rate, τ i
t, and shared equally among the agent’s (1+ nt) offspring.3 The
second-period budget constraint is therefore given by the following:
(3)
With respect to bequests in exchange for attention, it is assumed, as in Cox (1987)
and Davies (1996), that parents reap all the gains from the exchange. This implies
that the agent bequeaths to his children an amount just enough to compensate them
for the earnings forgone while spending time with him, that is,
4 (4)
It is further assumed that the representative agent derives utility from all of his chil-
dren’s attention. In view of the model’s symmetry, overall attention can be stated as
(5)
Finally, the accidental bequest received by the agent when young is equal to
(6)
where st–1 denotes per capita saving of his parents’ cohort, (1+rt) accrued gross
interest, and (1–π ) is the fraction of predecessors dying prematurely. The acci-
dental bequest will be divided equally among the agent and his nt–1 siblings and
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3While in most countries inheritance taxation is progressive in design, the present model employs a
proportional tax. The paper will later return to this matter.
4To be precise, this inheritance fully offsets the effects of providing attention only in the case where
the labor supply is exogenous. To see this, derive the life cycle budget constraint by solving equation (3)
for st and substituting into equation (2):
Obviously, attention, at, enters the constraint in two ways. For one thing, it reduces the endowment of
labor income; for another, it reduces the price of leisure. However, only the first effect is neutralized by
the inheritance, I
x
t, as formulated in equation (4). Therefore, unless the labor supply is exogenous and,
thus, lt =0 ,parents more than compensate children for providing attention. The use of equation (4) instead
of an explicit expenditure function seems, nevertheless, justifiable, given that the assumption that parents
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τ .Now consider the specification of the government sector. In the present model,
the government is confined to providing a pay as you go social insurance scheme.
In order to finance old-age benefits, the government can resort to a proportional
labor tax, a proportional inheritance tax, or both. The government is, therefore,
constrained by the following equations:
(7)
(8)
The left-hand sides of equations (7) and (8) denote government expenditure per
capita of the period t working population to be financed out of labor and inheri-
tance taxation, respectively. Specifically, trt is the benefit per pensioner, π the frac-
tion of surviving individuals, (1+ nt–1) the pensioner’s number of children, and β t
the (exogenously set) proportion of overall government expenditure to be financed
by inheritance taxation. Correspondingly, the equations’ right-hand sides give the
respective tax revenue per capita of the period t working population. In what fol-
lows, the analysis is restricted to a defined-benefit, pay as you go program.
Consequently, tr is exogenous and constant and, with all other variables deter-
mined outside the government sector, τ t and τ i
t are governed by the above equa-
tions (7) and (8).
The economy’s technology is described by means of a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function. Expressed per efficiency unit, it reads yt = kα
t,w here yt stands for
output per unit of labor, kt for capital intensity, and α for the capital income share.
Technical progress is not explicitly modeled; however, labor-augmenting progress
is implicitly taken into account in the population growth rate. Furthermore, factor




Finally, the capital market equilibrium condition, expressed in per capita magnitudes,
(11)
states that the capital stock is formed by gross saving of the preceding period. In
order to solve the model, the representative individual’s utility is maximized subject
to his life cycle budget constraint. The latter is obtained by means of equations (2)
through (6). This way, the Marshallian demand functions for all arguments included
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182factor incomes according to equations (7) through (10), one makes the micro-
economic decision conditional on the economy’s capital intensity. Finally, after
substituting the corresponding demand functions into the capital market equi-
librium condition, one ends up with the equation of motion, kt+1 = f(kt). On the
basis of this equation, one could solve for the steady state values of all variables.
Furthermore, one could determine the trajectories for all variables following a
fertility shock. Unfortunately, this nonlinear difference equation is too complex
to be solved analytically. For this reason, the model will be calibrated to fit the
German circumstances, and the fertility shock will be analyzed by way of
numerical simulation.
The model’s parameterization requires numerical values for the preference
parameters, λ , ρ , δ , ν , µ, and ϕ ; the probability of survival, π ; the capital income
share, α ; the old-age benefit, tr; and the population growth rate, nt. Of these
parameters, only α and nt are relatively straightforward. The population growth
rate falls from initially 1 percent per year to 0.5 percent, starting with generation t.
Remember that this figure reflects both the reproduction of the population and
labor-augmenting progress. Likewise clear-cut is the share of capital income in
GDP, which is commonly estimated at around 25 percent. Although the parame-
ters λ and ρ have been estimated under slightly different assumptions—none of
the studies included a desire for bequests and attention in the utility function—this
study, nonetheless, resorts to the values reported by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987, p. 50), namely, 0.8 and 0.83, respectively. The remaining parameters are
arbitrary, altogether.
In view of these difficulties, the paper will use as a point of reference the most
basic model, including as few preference parameters as possible. With most pref-
erence parameters set to zero and a relatively reliable estimate for λ —since now
the utility function does not include a desire for bequests and attention—the rate
of time preference, δ , and the pension, tr, can be chosen so as to generate realis-
tic values for the real interest rate, the capital-output ratio, and the rate of contri-
bution to social insurance. The rate of time preference is set to 1.5 percent per
year, ensuring a capital coefficient and interest rate of 3.4 and 4 percent, respec-
tively. The old-age transfer, tr, is set to bring about a contribution rate, τ t,o f  2 5
percent in the initial steady state. In Germany, the joint contribution rate to social
security, health insurance, and old-age care (Pflegeversicherung) amounts to 35
percent (see IW, 1999, Table 93). Taking into account the fact that all of these pro-
grams entail, albeit not to the full extent, public intergenerational transfers from
young to old, this estimate compares fairly well with reality.
Finally, the remaining parameters initially set to zero will be increased, one at
a time, to see how the inclusion of a specific bequest motive or an endogenous
labor supply changes the outcomes. This is what was earlier referred to as “com-
parative static analysis” in the context of an intertemporal general equilibrium
model. The parameter governing the intensity of the bequest motive is set so as to
generate a realistic ratio of bequests to GDP, namely, 5.8 percent. The desire for
leisure parameter, ν , is set to 0.1, which ensures a realistic rate of contribution
social insurance.
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183II. The Impact of Bequests on Intergenerational Distribution
Before simulating the fall of fertility in a general equilibrium setting, it is help-
ful to briefly contemplate the partial equilibrium effects. In this case, the capi-
tal stock is unaffected by the fertility shock—one could think of a small, open
economy with perfect capital mobility—and wages as well as interest rates are
constant over time.
Partial Equilibrium
No private transfers. To begin with, the implications of an aging population in the
most basic model are investigated, featuring a pay as you go social insurance
scheme but ignoring private intergenerational transfers. This model serves as a
reference for subsequent analysis and is generated by setting ν , µ, ϕ , and β to
zero and ϕ to unity. Accordingly, equations (2), (3), and (7) boil down to the
agent’s budget constraint:
(12)
The first generation to have fewer children is generation t, which, for convenience,
is sometimes referred to as the “baby-boomer” generation. Correspondingly, gen-
eration t +1 is at times referred to as the “baby-buster” generation. From equa-
tion (12), it follows that a permanent drop in fertility starting with generation t,
that is ... nt–2 = nt–1 > nt = nt+1 =…,w ill increase the social insurance liabilities
of all subsequent generations.
Joy of giving. Next, it is considered how the inclusion of bequests for joy of
giving might change the outcome. For this purpose ν , ϕ , and β are set to zero, π
to unity, and µto greater than zero. On the basis of equations (2), (3), and (7), the
household budget constraint becomes
(13)
Obviously, the life cycle resources of generation t are unchanged by the fertility
shock. However, with their number of children decreasing, the “price” of inheri-
tances is reduced. Consequently, baby boomers are better off than previous gener-
ations, and inheritances per capita of recipients unambiguously increase. In
correspondence with the previous scenario, baby busters are adversely hit by the
increase in social insurance contributions. In the present scenario, however, this
adverse effect will be cushioned through the receipt of larger inheritances.
Whether the increase in private intergenerational transfers is sufficient to offset the
increase in public intergenerational transfers is an empirical question, which can-





















































184Accidental bequests. In order to analyze the fertility shock in a setting where
bequests are accidental, ν ,µ,ϕ ,and β are set to zero and π to lower than unity. Based
on equations (2), (3), (6), and (7) the life cycle budget constraint changes into
(14)
The last term in equation (14) depicts per capita net transfers between the current
and preceding generation, that is, contributions to the pay as you go scheme less
received bequests. From equation (14), it follows that generation t, the first to have
fewer children, is unaffected by the fertility shock, implying that ∂ st/∂ nt = 0. With
this in mind, one can easily derive whether baby busters will be compensated
through larger inheritances for the fiscal burden imposed on them by population
aging. Transpose equation (14) by one period and differentiate life cycle resources
with respect to nt: it follows that baby busters will gain through a drop in fertility
precisely when (1–π )st(1+ r)>π tr. Put differently, when (a) bequests are predom-
inantly accidental and exceed defined benefits of a pay as you go scheme, (b) gen-
eral equilibrium effects are negligible, and (c) social insurance contributions
impose no work disincentives, rather than facing a demographic burden, baby
busters will experience a demographic windfall profit.
A glance at the corresponding data for Germany may help to assess whether
this scenario is even close to probable. Annual bequests are not obtainable from
official statistics. They can, however, be approximated by multiplying age-specific
wealth  st(1+ r) by age-specific mortality rates (1–π ). The age distribution of
aggregate private net wealth is derived by means of the 1993 Income and
Expenditure Survey (Federal Statistical Office, Germany, 1997). Weighting with
the corresponding mortality rates and summing up over all ages yields bequests of
DM 183 billion. Social security expenditures in 1993 came to DM 309 billion (see
IW, 1999, Table 93). However, according to Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001),
only 80 percent of these expenditures constitute intergenerational transfers, while
the rest is mere intragenerational redistribution. For lack of adequate data, it is fur-
ther assumed that health and old-age insurance contain pay as you go elements of
negligible magnitude. Accordingly, an adequate figure for public intergenerational
transfers is DM 247 billion.
In view of these figures, it is highly improbable that baby busters are not
adversely affected by a demographic transition. This is reinforced when the
assumptions are relaxed. For one thing, public health insurance and old-age care
certainly include a noteworthy fraction of intergenerational transfers, in which
case the figure for public transfers has to be adjusted upward. For another thing,
not all bequests observed in 1993 were accidental, implying that at least the frac-
tion motivated by joy of giving might be adjusted downward as the number of
heirs declines (still maintaining a larger inheritance per heir).
Bequests as exchange. Finally, the effects of a fertility shock are explored on
the assumption that most private intergenerational transfers are made in exchange
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185ϕ to greater than unity. Combining equations (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7), the agent’s
budget constraint comes to the following:
(15)
Recall that the agent “purchases” attention from his offspring by compensating
them for earnings forgone while spending time with him. Therefore, the price for
attention is the offspring’s net wage, discounted to the present. Moreover, owing
to the compensation, neither inheritances nor attention—apart from their appear-
ance in net taxes—turn up as supplement or diminution, respectively, of the
agent’s life cycle earnings. According to equation (4), inheritances received and
attention provided just cancel out.
The effects of a drop in fertility can be outlined as follows. According to equa-
tion (15), generation t, the first to have fewer children, does not face any change in
life cycle resources. Nonetheless, this generation experiences a welfare gain. Given
that their children’s net wages will decline—as is detailed below—they pay a lower
price for attention. Baby busters also profit from a lower price for attention. In their
case, however, the favorable effect is negligible, compared with the adverse effect
induced by the pay as you go scheme. Thus, contribution rates increase for two rea-
sons. First, the ratio of workers to pensioners has deteriorated. Second, labor sup-
ply has declined, as workers spend more time with their parents—an activity that
has become necessary as fewer siblings share the burden of taking care of their par-
ents. Most important, and contrary to the preceding transfer motives, there is no off-
setting windfall profit in the form of inheritances. It is, therefore, impossible for
future generations to be better off than the present ones.
General Equilibrium
The partial equilibrium assumption is adequate only for a small, open economy.
Given that all western economies undergo a similar demographic transition, this
assumption is certainly inappropriate. The paper, therefore, moves on to the anal-
ysis of the general equilibrium setting. Figure 1 summarizes the findings by con-
trasting the welfare paths of the four models described in the first part of this
section. Generational welfare is measured as the relative equivalent variation in
life cycle earnings and generation 0 is the first to exhibit a lower fertility.
Contrary to the partial equilibrium analysis, generation 0 is already adversely
affected by the fertility shock in a general equilibrium context. This welfare effect,
however, is not transmitted through the pay as you go scheme but is attributable to
the transition’s direct effect on factor incomes. In particular, the decline in labor
relative to capital will lead to a lower interest rate in period t=1, thereby increas-
ing that generation’s price of old-age consumption. Generation 1 will face the
same price effect but will profit from a higher capital intensity in the form of
higher wages. Factor income movements during a demographic transition thus
favor baby busters over baby boomers and, in this way, help to mitigate the uneven
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186In combination with the factor price effect, accidental bequests now reverse
the distributional impact of the pay as you go scheme by putting baby busters
ahead of baby boomers in terms of life cycle resources.5 The same holds for
bequests for joy of giving, albeit to a lesser extent.6 In the case of accidental
bequests, baby busters even reach the welfare level of generations entirely unaf-
fected by the fertility shock. However, in the no-bequest case, and consequently
also in the bequests as exchange case, the earlier finding that baby busters suffer
a welfare loss relative to baby boomers carries over to the general equilibrium
analysis.7 As indicated in Figure 1, the provision of bequests as exchange may

































No bequests Joy of giving Accidental Exchange
Figure 1. Comparing Welfare Paths for Various Bequest Motives
(In relative equivalent variation of life cycle resources)
5This result is quite robust to alternative specifications of the bequest parameter π . Only if acciden-
tal bequests accounted for less than 0.8 percent of GDP would future generations lose more than baby
boomers. In this simulation the ratio of bequests to GDP amounts to 5.8 percent, which corresponds to the
German circumstances.
6This finding is also fairly robust to a variation in the bequest parameter µ. Only if bequests came to
less than 3.4 percent of GDP would baby busters experience a lower welfare level than baby boomers.
7Raffelhüschen and Risa (1997) also demonstrate that in the no-bequest model factor price effects can
reverse the initial distribution between baby busters and baby boomers. They admit, however, that their
calibration was deliberately chosen in order to produce this result. In particular, their assumed contribu-
tion rate of 15 percent seems much too low.Erik Lueth
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even exacerbate the intergenerational imbalance brought about by the pay as you
go system because parents pay too low a price for the attention provided by their
children. This works as follows: the providing of attention is costly both in terms
of forgone working time and lower net wages during working hours. While the
first effect is compensated for through inheritances, the second effect goes uncom-
pensated. Thus, parents pay too low a price for attention purchased from their chil-
dren. One might question why children consent to the exchange when it makes
them worse off. The answer is that they simply do not perceive the link, implicit
in equation (7), between providing attention and reducing the labor supply, on the
one hand, and increasing contributions to social insurance, on the other hand. This
is especially likely in Germany, where on a microeconomic level the equivalence
between contributions and benefits is far from perfect.
The role of private intergenerational transfers during a demographic transi-
tion greatly varies, depending on the underlying motive. With respect to their
distributional implications, accidental bequests and exchange-motivated
bequests can be regarded as the opposite ends of a spectrum. In the case of acci-
dental bequests, heirs appropriate the complete windfall gain resulting from the
decline in the number of heirs relative to testators. In the case of bequests as
exchange, the demographic transition does not bring about any windfall profit.
However, when the pay as you go scheme is financed through a flat-rate tax, the
demographic transition enables parents to extract resources from their offspring.
Bequests for joy of giving, finally, take an intermediate position, with the wind-
fall gain shared more or less equally between testators and heirs. From this
ranking, it follows that, if accidental bequests do not lead to a compensation—
as, for example, seems likely in a partial equilibrium setting—none of the
bequest motives will.
In light of Figure 1, one might argue that the welfare position of genera-
tion 1 relative to generation 0 is secondary to the welfare loss suffered by gen-
eration 0. This amounts to saying that the effect of a fertility shock on factor
incomes is of greater concern than its effect on the pay as you go social insur-
ance scheme. However, in the present model, the adverse welfare effect of
increasing contribution rates is highly understated by abstracting from an
endogenous labor supply. Making allowances for distortionary taxes will reverse
the relative importance of factor price and tax effects. This will be clarified in
the following section.
III. Endogenous Labor Supply and the Taxation of Bequests
This section introduces an endogenous labor supply. In combination with a flat-
rate tax, this allows for the distortions hitherto neglected. The paper will then
focus on three questions. First, is the excess burden induced by distortionary con-
tributions to social insurance likely to be significant? Second, do the qualitative
results of the last part of Section II carry over to a more realistic setting that
includes distortionary taxes? Finally, are inheritance taxes less distortionary than
payroll taxes? If so, could the excess burden be reduced by financing part of the
social insurance benefits out of inheritance, rather than labor, taxes?The Impact of Distortionary Social Insurance Contributions
Once more, let the analysis begin with the most basic model, abstracting from pri-
vate intergenerational transfers altogether. This model incorporates an endogenous
labor supply and is a natural extension of the reference no-bequest model defined
in Section II. In particular, all parameter values correspond to those of the refer-
ence model, with the exception of the desire for leisure parameter, ν ,w h i c h   is set
to a value greater than zero. The present model contains the government budget
constraint,
(16)
as well as the household budget constraint,
(17)
obtained from equations (2), (3), and (7). Again, it is convenient to begin with a
partial equilibrium consideration. As is obvious from equation (17), a drop in fer-
tility will not affect the first generation to have fewer children, say generation t.
This generation still faces an unchanged dependency ratio during working years
and, therefore, experiences neither price nor income shocks. In contrast, genera-
tion t+1 is hit in various ways. First, as indicated by equation (16), this generation
will see its contributions to social insurance increase, owing to a worsened ratio of
workers to pensioners. The falling net wage, in turn, will induce baby busters to
reduce their labor supply, thereby further boosting contributions to social insur-
ance. Future generations will, therefore, be worse off than those presently living.
The crucial question of this section, however, is whether the welfare loss of
future relative to present generations is larger than in the second part of Section II,
where labor disincentive effects were not taken into account. This only holds if the
distortion caused by social insurance increases as the population grows older. To
examine whether this is the case, the analysis proceeds as follows. All terms of
equation (17) are brought onto the left-hand side and differentiated with respect to
lt, while taking into account the dependency ∂τ t/∂ lt >0 ,as specified by equa-
tion (16). This way, one derives the real opportunity cost—measured as resources
not available for other uses—of a marginal increase in the demand for leisure:
(18)
Note that the first term on the right-hand side denotes the marginal cost as per-
ceived by the agent. Consequently, the pay as you go scheme drives a wedge
between true and perceived marginal costs and, hence, causes the inefficiency.
What is more important, this wedge increases as the population growth rate
declines. With this adverse effect coming on top of the income effect, the welfare
loss of future relative to presently living generations must be larger in a setting
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189As illustrated by Figure 2, this analysis carries over to a general equilibrium
setting. While in a setting of exogenous labor supply, future generations suffer in
the long run a welfare loss equivalent to 2.5 percent of life cycle resources; this loss
rises to 3.5 percent when allowing for an endogenous labor supply. Accordingly, the
welfare loss due to labor disincentive effects accounts for one-third of the overall
welfare loss induced by a fertility shock. Of course, these figures should not be
taken too literally. For one reason, the model both in structure and in parameteriza-
tion is a poor characterization of reality. For another reason, at least the social secu-
rity component of the German pay as you go scheme does incorporate some
equivalence between contributions and benefits. The distortion generated by the
model is, therefore, exaggerated. With these caveats in mind, the labor disincentive
effect seems, nevertheless, substantial.
From the analysis of this section, it follows that future generations’fiscal burden
can be reduced without, at the same time, increasing present generations’net taxes.
This can be done by strengthening the link between what people pay into the public
coffers and what they get in return. However, this policy measure, while neutral with
respect to intergenerational distribution, affects intragenerational distribution.
Before models that include private intergenerational transfers are examined, a
question left open from Section II needs to be clarified. Figure 1 made one believe
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Exogenous labor supply Endogenous labor supply 
Figure 2. Distortionary Contributions in the No-Bequest Model
(In relative equivalent variation of life cycle resources)
Note: The welfare paths correspond to ν =0   (“diamond” line) and ν >0     (“square” line).drop in baby boomers’ interest income. Taking into account labor disincentive
effects, this finding is somewhat modified. While still amounting to 1.5 percent,
the welfare loss of baby boomers seems modest compared to the 3.5 percent loss
suffered by future generations, and even in proportion to the 2.6 percent loss expe-
rienced by baby busters.
Joy of Giving
This section takes as its basis the model of Section II featuring bequests for joy of
giving. In contrast to that model, however, the labor supply is endogenized. In
addition, the present model permits the tax base of the pay as you go scheme to be
switched. By increasing β t from an initial value of zero, an increasing share of
social insurance benefits is financed out of inheritance instead of payroll taxes.
The model is, therefore, characterized by the government budget constraints
and (19)
(20)
as well as the household budget constraint
(21)
based on equations (2), (3), (7), and (8). To begin with, it is investigated whether
making allowances for distortionary taxes changes the qualitative outcomes of the
second part of Section II. For this purpose, β t is set to zero for all t. As illustrated
by the “square” line in Figure 3, taking distortionary taxes into account does make
a difference. In particular, the increase in inheritances received by baby busters is
no longer sufficient to make up for both larger social security contributions and
greater distortions relative to baby boomers. Future generations are, therefore,
worse off than those presently living.
Next, it is inspected whether the government can, in any efficient way, exploit
inheritances to ease the distributional conflict between present and future genera-
tions. The government could, for example, tax private transfers and use the pro-
ceeds to reduce public transfers. This experiment is depicted by the “triangle” line
in Figure 3. Specifically, it is assumed that 10 percent of social insurance expen-
ditures are financed by inheritance taxation, starting with bequests from boomers
to busters. Obviously, this policy affects both intergenerational distribution and
overall efficiency. Baby boomers share the fiscal burden induced by population
aging through a higher price of inheritances. However, the effect on efficiency
may be adverse, and, with the model’s present parameterization, it is.8 Given that
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8This qualitative finding is robust with respect to timing and magnitude of the inheritance tax.the corresponding elasticities of substitution and, consequently, is an empirical
question in the first place. With a slightly different parameterization—for example
λ = 0.5—the tax switch generates efficiency gains.
In view of the empirical imponderabilities, the case for inheritance taxation
does not seem particularly strong. From a dynamic perspective, however, this
assessment might change. In contrast to a payroll tax, the distortion of an inheri-
tance tax does not increase in the event of population aging. To see this, proceed
as in the first part of this section. Bring all terms of equation (21) onto the left-
hand side and differentiate with respect to It+1 while taking into account the rela-
tion ∂τ i
t+1 / ∂ It+1 <0 ,as specified by equation (20). This yields the marginal cost
of bequeathing in terms of forgone resources:
(22)
The agent only perceives the first term on the right-hand side and, therefore, too
high a marginal cost if inheritance taxes are in effect, that is, β t+1 > 0. Taxes on


























































Exogenous & payroll tax Endogenous & payroll tax
Endogenous & inheritance tax
Figure 3. The Taxation of Bequests for Joy of Giving
(In relative equivalent variation of life cycle resources)
Note: The welfare paths correspond to ν =0  and β =0  (“diamond” line), ν >0  and β =0  (“square”
line), and ν >0   and β t = 0.1 for t ≥ 1 (“triangle” line).excessive consumption on the part of the testator. The wedge between true and
perceived marginal costs, however, is independent of the population growth rate.
To the extent that old-age benefits are financed through inheritance taxation, they
no longer constitute intergenerational transfers and, thus, are unaffected by the
old-age dependency ratio.
From this reasoning, one might deduce the following proposition. If the mix
of payroll and inheritance taxes, as presently observed, is optimal (in the sense that
the actual β maximizes agents’ utility), the share of old-age benefits that is
financed out of inheritance taxes must increase for this policy to remain optimal
during a demographic transition. Because the distortion of inheritance relative to
payroll taxation declines in the course of population aging, the overall excess bur-
den can be minimized by shifting a larger part of the demographic burden onto
inheritance taxation.
Accidental Bequests
In the following, an endogenous labor supply is added to the accidental bequest
model of Section II. This leads to the government budget constraints,
and (23)
(24)
as well as the household budget constraint,
(25)
according to equations (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8). First, it is inspected how robust
the qualitative implications of the earlier analysis of accidental bequests are to the
inclusion of distortionary taxes. It was established that the increase in accidental
bequests is sufficient to make up for the negative income effect of social insurance
contributions. As recapitulated by the “diamond” line in Figure 4, baby busters
are, therefore, better off than baby boomers and even reach the welfare level of
their grandparents, who are spared the drop in interest income. If one makes
allowances for labor disincentive effects, baby busters are still better off than baby
boomers but no longer reach the welfare level of generations entirely unaffected
by the fertility shock, as is illustrated by the “square” line.
Next, consider the rationale for shifting part of the tax burden onto inheri-
tances. A glance at the household’s budget constraint reveals that the taxation of
accidental bequests entails no distortion of relative prices and, as a consequence,
no welfare loss. A switch from the distortionary payroll tax to a lump-sum taxa-
tion of accidental bequests is, therefore, always, and at any time, recommendable.
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193welfare on the assumption that, with immediate effect, 60 percent of social insur-
ance benefits are financed through inheritance taxation.9 The new trajectory at no
point moves below the old one and, thus, indicates a Pareto improvement.
Furthermore, it does not come as a surprise that, with a large part of the distortion
eliminated, the welfare path closely tracks that of the second part of Section II.
While it is always advisable to increase taxes on accidental bequests, the case for
such a policy shift is reinforced by the coming demographic transition. As was
demonstrated earlier, distortions of payroll taxes will still increase as the popula-
tion grows older.
Bequests As Exchange
Finally, the effects and policy implications of bequests as exchange are reviewed
when labor supply is endogenous. Apart from ν , the model is parameterized as





























Exogenous & payroll tax Endogenous & payroll tax
Endogenous & inheritance tax
Figure 4. The Taxation of Accidental Bequests
(In relative equivalent variation of life cycle resources)
Note: The welfare paths correspond to ν =0  and β =0  (“diamond” line), ν >0  and β =0  (“square”
line), and ν >0   and β t = 0.6 for t ≥ 0 (“triangle” line).
9This policy implies that inheritances are completely taxed away. Rather than claiming realism, this
scenario illustrates that, given exclusively accidental bequests, the more tax shifting, the better.and (26)
(27)
and the representative individual faces the life cycle budget constraint
(28)
derived from equations (2), (3), (4), (5), (7), and (8). To begin with, β t is set to 0
for all t, and it is investigated how an increase in ν affects generations’welfare dur-
ing a demographic transition. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which contrasts the
welfare trajectories for an exogenous (“diamond” line) and endogenous (“square”
line) labor supply. Not surprisingly, future generations are worse off when labor
disincentive effects are added to the negative income effect induced by a worsen-
ing dependency ratio. Consequently, the noncompensation outcome of the earlier
analysis is reinforced in a more realistic setting.
Next, the allocative effects of taxing inheritances are exploited. The “triangle”
line in Figure 5 depicts generations’ welfare on the assumption that the govern-
ment, with immediate effect, switches from pure payroll taxation to a hybrid
scheme, with 2 percent of tax revenue levied by inheritance taxation. While cer-
tainly favorable on distributional grounds, the tax switch—whenever enacted—
also improves efficiency, as will be established below.
To begin with, the lowering of payroll taxes reduces distortions. This becomes
apparent when contrasting true and perceived marginal costs of reducing the
labor supply. Once more, proceed by bringing all terms in equation (28) onto the
left-hand side and substitute It by means of equation (4). Then differentiate with
respect to lt, while making allowances for the relation ∂τ t /∂ lt >0 ,a s  g i v en by
equation (26). The true opportunity cost of marginally reducing labor supply
thus equals
(29)
Once more, the social insurance scheme drives a wedge (henceforth, WEt)
between true and perceived marginal costs, as specified by the last term of equa-
tion (29). This wedge can be reduced by raising the share of tax revenue, β t,l e vied
through inheritance taxation. The problem’s dynamic dimension becomes obvious
when it is taken into account that ∂ WEt /∂ nt–1<0 and ∂ WEt /∂ at>0. Thus, while
it is always welfare enhancing to increase the share of inheritance tax revenue, it
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195magnifies the initial distortion. Furthermore, in the presence of bequests as
exchange, the deterioration is greater than in previous models. As was made clear
in the first part of Section II, a baby buster spends more time with his parents,
since the burden of taking care of one’s parents is shared by fewer siblings. In
addition to the direct effect, a drop in fertility therefore magnifies the distortion via
∂ WEt / ∂ at >0 .  G i v en that … = nt–1 > nt = nt+1 =…a n d…=at–1 = at <a t+1 …,
inheritances should be taxed in the following period at the latest, that is, when
baby boomers die and inheritances increase.
So far, only the beneficial effect of reducing payroll taxes has been consid-
ered. What about the welfare effect of increasing the inheritance tax? While in the
case of joy of giving and accidental bequests, inheritance taxation is harmful or
neutral, respectively, it is welfare enhancing when bequests are motivated by
exchange. As shown above, children do not perceive that providing attention to
their parents is costly in terms of higher contribution rates, because of the lack of
equivalence between contributions and benefits. Consequently, they charge too
low a price for attention, thereby spurring excessive demand on the part of the par-
ents. Inheritance taxation, at least partly, corrects for this distortion by raising the





























Exogenous & payroll tax Endogenous & payroll tax
Endogenous & inheritance tax
Figure 5. The Taxation of Bequests As Exchange
(In relative equivalent variation of life cycle resources)
Note: The welfare paths correspond to ν =0  and β =0  (“diamond” line), ν >0  and β =0  (“square”
line), and ν >0   and β t = 0.6 for t ≥ 0 (“triangle” line).terms of equation (28) onto the left-hand side and differentiate with respect to at,
while making allowances for ∂τ t / ∂ at >0 ,as specified by equation (26). The true
opportunity cost of providing a marginal unit of attention comes to
(30)
The first term on the right-hand side depicts the effect that the provision of
attention has in reducing the price of leisure, and the second term stands for the
reduction in the endowment of labor income. Strictly speaking, both effects
would have to be taken into account by children when pricing attention. Recall,
however, that the analysis has abstracted from the former effect in order to keep
the model tractable (see footnote 4). The third term gives the cost of higher con-
tribution rates and constitutes a distortion in that it is not passed on in prices.
Children charge too low a price, at (1–τ t)wt, while parents pay a price of
(1+ τ i
t)(1–τ t)wt.10 Consequently, by approximating prices to marginal costs,
the inheritance tax partially offsets the distortion. As before, the distortion
increases in the course of population aging. Although it enhances welfare at any
time, the taxation of bequests as exchange should, therefore, be increased in the
following period at the latest.
Among the three prominent transfer motives, the case for taxing inheritances
is strongest for bequests as exchange. Under this transfer motive, both the reduc-
tion of payroll taxes and the taxing of inheritances diminish distortions. However,
it is worthwhile to inquire to what extent this result is driven by the simplifying
assumptions. First, consider the simplification just noted (see footnote 4). With
children charging parents (1–lt)(1–τ t)wt, instead of (1–τ t)wt, the wedge between
price and marginal costs would be even greater and the finding of the simulation
reinforced. Second, following Cox (1987), it was assumed that parents reap all
gains from the exchange. Modeling the exchange as a “Nash bargain” instead
would not change the results. Children would still perceive the wrong cost of pro-
viding attention, which could be corrected by inheritance taxation. 
Finally, following Davies (1996), the cost of providing attention was modeled
in terms of forgone time—an assumption that does drive the results. Using a more
general formulation as in Cox (1987), the wedge between true and perceived
marginal costs as specified by the last term in equation (30) would disappear, and
taxing inheritances would introduce, rather than correct for, a distortion. It should
be stressed, however, that this distortion is independent of the population growth
rate. One can, therefore, resort to the weaker proposition, already stated in the con-
text of bequests for joy of giving: if the mix of payroll and inheritance taxation is
optimal at present, maintaining this optimal fiscal policy during population aging
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First, the implications of private transfers for intergenerational distribution have
been analyzed in the paper. It is shown that the prominent bequest motives can be
ranked, with accidental bequests being most favorable for future generations dur-
ing a demographic transition. Consequently, by showing that accidental bequests
are not sufficient to compensate future generations for the fiscal burden, the non-
compensation result has been established for all of the prominent bequest motives.
This is first done in a partial equilibrium setting with exogenous labor supply.
However, the noncompensation result also carries over to a general equilibrium
setting with endogenous labor supply. Thus, accidental bequests do not suffice to
raise baby busters’ welfare to the level experienced by generations entirely unaf-
fected by the fertility shock.
Next it has been investigated whether the fiscal burden of future generations
can be alleviated by shifting part of the tax burden from payroll to inheritance tax-
ation. On the one hand, inheritance taxes are very popular because they promote
intergenerational mobility and equal opportunity. On the other hand, governments
have been very cautious in taxing private intergenerational transfers, lacking ade-
quate evidence on the underlying motives. While it is well understood that acci-
dental bequests can be taxed at no efficiency cost, the taxing of altruistic bequests
leads to excessive consumption on the part of testators and, thus, to suboptimal
capital accumulation and growth.
While so far the literature has not established a predominant bequest motive
and, as a consequence, has been unable to suggest the optimal extent of inheri-
tance taxation, in this paper a somewhat weaker recommendation has been
derived. Provided that the mix of inheritance and payroll taxes, as presently
observed, is more or less efficient—after all, it is the result of a long trial and error
process—the share of inheritance taxes in overall tax revenue must increase for
this mix to remain efficient during a demographic transition. The intuition behind
this result is that a pay as you go system that is financed by taxes on the elderly
does not require an increase in contribution rates in the event of a worsening
dependency ratio. Therefore, with the distortion of inheritance relative to payroll
taxes decreasing during a demographic transition, a shift toward inheritance taxa-
tion minimizes overall distortions. Taking into account that tax evasion is much
easier under inheritance taxation does not invalidate the basic argument; it only
reduces the scope for efficiency gains by tax switching. Also, clear implications
with respect to the timing of the tax shift were deduced. In particular, inheritance
taxes should be raised as soon as one observes substantially larger inheritances per
capita. Since in most countries per capita inheritances are taxed using a progres-
sive tariff, the average tax rate will increase anyway during the demographic tran-
sition; still, it might be recommendable to increase the degree of progression.
Of course a myriad of other measures can be undertaken to reduce tax distor-
tions induced by population aging. As stated above, one can strengthen the link
between contributions and benefits. Furthermore, one can trim the pay as you go
scheme by partially funding pension benefits. While these measures are certainly
necessary, they have a limited scope. Strengthening the link between contributions
Erik Lueth
198and benefits, for example, conflicts with the objectives of intragenerational distri-
bution. Funding social security is certainly an option in the long run. In the short
run, however, existing pension entitlements must be honored so that public inter-
generational transfers will persist for some time. The taxation of inheritances,
therefore, should not be viewed as a substitute for other measures; rather, it is a
further component in the effort to cope with population aging.
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